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1Abstract
We characterize optimal IPO design in the presence of distinct ad-
verse selection problems: one a⁄ecting the IPO stage and one arising
in the after-market. Allocating shares to an investor with superior
information in the after-market depresses the share￿ s value to less
informed investors. However, because it facilitates truthful interest
report at the IPO stage it increases the expected o⁄er price provided
disadvantaged investors are su¢ ciently unlikely to ￿ ip their share.
We compare the book-building￿ s outcome to that of uniform price
auction. The auction can enhance the expected o⁄er price only if it
systematically allocates a share to the strategic trader.
JEL Classi￿cation: G24, G32.
Keywords: Initial Public O⁄ering, Book-building, Auction, Informed Trad-
ing, Secondary Market and Dealer Market.
21 Introduction
Most of the literature considering the optimal allocation and pricing of shares
in an initial public o⁄ering (hereafter IPO) ignores the outcome of after-market
trading and its impact on the o⁄er price. Yet, if an investor has access to
superior information in the after-market about the future value of the stock
he can use it strategically and make a pro￿t at the expense of less informed
investors. The prospect of winning or losing money in the secondary market
necessarily a⁄ects the investors￿interest for the shares and consequently the
o⁄er price.
Incorporating after-market trading in IPO analysis is critical when there
is residual uncertainty about the value of the stock which some traders can
learn and use. Empirical evidence of strategic trading in the aftermarket is
documented in Krigman et al. (1999), Minnigoulov (2001), and more recently
in Boehmer et al. (2006). These articles show that ￿ ipping is a signi￿cant
predictor of future stock performance.1 They establish evidence of after-market
trading based on information that has not been revealed during the IPO stage.
Allocating shares to investors with access to superior information in the after-
market depresses the willingness to pay of investors with no such knowledge
and thus the o⁄er price. A priori one would think that strategic traders, when
identi￿ed, should not be allocated any shares. We prove otherwise.
To our knowledge only Ellul and Pagano (2006) and Busaba and Chang
1Flipping is de￿ned as selling in the after-market on the ￿rst day of trading the acquired
shares during the IPO.
3(2005) analyze IPO modeling both the pre-market and the secondary market.
Ellul and Pagano (2006) considers a setting with two types of private informa-
tion, one a⁄ecting the primary market and the other arising in the secondary
market. They rationalize IPO underpricing as resulting from after-market illiq-
uidity. More precisely, underpricing is required to compensate investors who buy
shares in an IPO and potentially liquidate these in the after-market where some
traders have superior information. We consider a similar (informational) setting
but focus on optimal IPO design. In that respect Busaba and Chang (2005) is
closer to this paper. Considering investors who possess private information prior
to the IPO, they analyze price discovery under book-building and ￿xed price of-
fering. With book-building private information is (strategically) revealed during
the road show and used for the pricing and allocation of shares. By opposition
price discovery takes place in the after-market under ￿xed price o⁄ering. In-
terestingly they show that unless entry is restricted under book-building, ￿xed
price o⁄ering targeting uninformed investors minimizes underpricing. Extract-
ing truthful information during the road show (book-building) is expensive since
investors can extract the usual informational rents at the pre-market stage as
well as rents in the after-market. As a main contrast, we consider that investors
who possess private information at the IPO stage are at disadvantage in the
after-market. While their information has been revealed during the road show,
some residual uncertainty remains and is privately known and used by other
traders.
Our paper characterizes the optimal pricing and allocation of shares in the
4presence of distinct adverse selection problems under a book-building mecha-
nism. We then compare this outcome with that of a uniform price auction.
We rely on a simple model where investors taking part in an IPO di⁄er in their
information and thus motives. As in Benveniste and Spindt (1989), some in-
vestors have private information about the company going public at the time of
the IPO. They only participate in the secondary market if they face liquidity
needs. Others access private information about the future value of the stock
once shares are allocated and strategically trade the asset in the after-market.
The after-market is modelled as a competitive dealer market (similar to Glosten
and Milgrom (1985)). Non strategic traders are su¢ ciently numerous to exhaust
the issue and the underwriter knows the investors￿identity.
We abstract from agency problem between the issuer and underwriter and
assume that the underwriter seeks to maximize the expected o⁄er price sub-
ject to inducing truthful information reports from initially informed investors.
Misreporting strong interest allows these investors to gather informational rents
but depreciates the after-market pro￿ts.2 Indeed the market maker infers in-
formation from the o⁄er price which re￿ ects the expressions of interest. Thus
down-playing interest results in a lower bid price leading the investors to incur a
self-in￿ ected punishment. As liquidity needs become more likely, the incentive
to misreport strong interest weakens. Therefore two solutions emerge depending
on the probability with which investors face liquidity needs. When it is high
enough, the incentive constraint is less of a burden and the underwriter never
2This contrasts sharply with Busaba and Chang (2005) where investors bene￿t from lying
as they transfer their informational advantage to the after-market.
5serves the strategic trader. Serving this investor would depreciate the willing-
ness to pay of other investors and thus the o⁄er price. When liquidity needs
are su¢ ciently unlikely allocating a share to the strategic trader helps to punish
dishonest investors. Not only does it diminish their odds of getting a share, it
also lowers their rents from after-market trading.
Under a uniform price auction the underwriter commits to sell the shares to
the highest bidders and keeps no discretion over pricing and allocation. Because
investors care about the aftermarket outcome and because bids are observable
they can be used to signal information to dealers. In particular the bid price in
the after-market increases as good information is inferred from the bids. Two
results stand out. First, we prove that a situation where the strategic trader
never wins is not an equilibrium. Second, we show that an auction can raise
more revenue than book-building provided the strategic trader outbids other
investors and thus always gets a share.
Finally, this paper also relates to the literature on auctions with external-
ities.3 Indeed, due to aftermarket activity, a bidder￿ s valuation of the asset is
determined by the allocation of shares. The following two features separate our
model from this literature. First, all winners bear an externality due to fact that
we have a multi-unit setting. Second, externalities are endogenously determined
via the allocation rule.
The paper unfolds as follows. The model is presented in the next section.
Section 3 and 4 provide the results. We conclude in section 5. Unless in the
3See Jehiel and Moldovanu (1996) and (2000) and Jehiel et al. (1996).
6text, all proofs are gathered in section 6.
2 The Model
We consider a setting where the ￿rm going public and its underwriter have the
same objective. Their goal is to allocate Q shares (where Q = 2) at the highest
possible o⁄er price. There are three investors who di⁄er in their information.
Two are initially informed ( at the IPO stage) and are willing to keep the share
unless they face liquidity needs. We refer to these as informed investors. In
addition there is one investor who has no relevant information at the IPO stage
but has access to information in the aftermarket. He is then in a position
to trade his share strategically and we refer to him as the strategic trader.
The underwriter knows which investor can trade strategically. Each investor is
willing to buy at most one share thus there are enough informed investors to
exhaust the issue.
The value of a share is determined as follows. As in Benveniste and Spindt
(1989) it re￿ ects the valuation or interest of informed investors. However there
is residual uncertainty that these investors cannot learn. As in Pagano and Ellul
(2006) this represents news that will eventually become common knowledge but
is privately observed by the strategic trader after the IPO. This residual uncer-
tainty is denoted by ~ ", with ~ " 2 f￿";+"g each arising with equal probability.
More precisely each informed investor can have a strong or a weak interest in
the issue. Let ~ ￿ 2 f￿￿;+￿g represent an informed investor￿ s interest (or in-
7formation) where +￿ occurs with probability q. There are 3 relevant states of
nature (k = 0;1;2). Each refers to the number of informed investors with strong
interest (+￿). In state k, the ￿nal value of the share (~ Vk) is
~ Vk = v + ￿k + ~ ";
where v > 0, and ￿k re￿ ects the aggregate interest for the asset (￿2 = 2￿;
￿1 = 0 and ￿0 = ￿2￿). We assume that v is su¢ ciently large to ensure that the
expected value of the asset to any investor is always positive so that they wish
to buy it.
We now describe the IPO stage and highlight the di⁄erences between book-
building and auction. Under book-building the timing is as follows. First in-
formed investors privately learn their information about the company going
public: each draws a value for ~ ￿ independently. Second the underwriter an-
nounces a mechanism specifying the o⁄er prices and the allocation rules for any
possible set of messages. Third, given the mechanism the informed investors
send a message and the underwriter sets the o⁄er price and allocates the shares.
Finally, all investors update their information (about ~ ￿) based on the price ob-
served and the allocation rule and accept or reject the underwriter￿ s o⁄er.
Under a uniform price auction the underwriter commits to sell the shares to
the highest bidders at a price equal to the highest losing bid. The timing is
as follows. First each informed investor learns his information. Second all in-
vestors bid. Third shares are allocated and priced. We assume that bidding is
8a commitment to buy at a price at most equal to the bid.
Basically the two mechanisms di⁄er in the amount of discretion the under-
writer has in allocating the shares. With an auction the underwriter has less
discretion.
Once shares are allocated the after-market trading stage begins. It is mod-
elled as a dealer market. Prices are set by competitive risk neutral dealers.
At this stage the strategic trader privately observes ~ " and, if he has a share,
decides to sell it or keep it based on his information. The informed investors
are non-strategic players and sell their share with probability z, where z is the
probability of facing liquidity needs (as in Pagano and Ellul (2006)).
3 IPO under Book-building
We ￿rst analyze the outcome of the after-market to evaluate the investors￿will-
ingness to pay. Then we solve for the optimal IPO.
3.1 The aftermarket and the investors￿valuations
Let pb
k refer to the bid price when the dealer infers state k has occured given the
o⁄er price and allocation. This is in sharp contrast with Pagano and Ellul (2006)
where the state of Nature becomes public information. Given this approach,
an informed investor will confuse both the underwriter and the dealer when
misreporting interest.
Assume the strategic trader got a share in state k with probability ￿k (k =
0;1;2) and ￿k 2 [0;1]. Consequently the conditional probability of facing an







[v + ￿k ￿ "] +
2z
￿k + 2z
[v + ￿k]: (1)
Let RI
k(￿k) (respectively RS
k(￿k)) represents the value of a share to an in-




k + (1 ￿ z)(v + ￿k) (2)
since E (") = 0. With probability z the investor has liquidity needs and sells his
share at pb
k, and with probability (1￿z) he keeps the share. Simplifying we get
RI













(v + ￿k + "): (4)
Indeed, given pb
k, the strategic trader is better o⁄ selling if and only if he gets a
bad news (~ " = ￿"). The above simpli￿es to
RS




4We implicitly assume that the strategic trader is able to perfectly learn the state of nature.
This assumption will be veri￿ed in equilibrium.
10Two features appear. First the strategic trader has a higher willingness to
pay: RI
k(￿k) < RS
k(￿k). Second, if z > 0, allocating a share to the strategic
trader decreases the informed investors￿willingness to pay.
3.2 Optimal IPO design
The underwriter wants to maximize the revenue from the IPO which is equiv-











k refers to the o⁄er price in state k. The allocation and o⁄er prices must
satisfy the voluntary participation and the incentive compatibility constraints.
￿ Voluntary participation constraints.
We follow Benveniste and Spindt (1989) and assume that the underwriter￿ s
o⁄er is accepted (or rejected) ex-post, that is after information about ￿k can
be updated. Since the strategic trader has a higher willingness to pay than




k (￿k) k 2 f0;1;2g: (7)
11￿ Incentive compatibility constraints.
Let xk0(m) denote the probability that an informed investor gets a share
when he sends message m 2 f￿￿;+￿g and when the underwriter infers state k0
with k0 = 0;1;2 given the 2 messages received. We have xk0(m) 2 [0;1] for all



























It is important to mention that, in our setting, when the informed investor
lies he misleads the dealer who bases her information on the observed o⁄er price
and allocation. As in most asymmetric information problem the constraint
ensuring that an investor with low interest reports it truthfully is automatically
satis￿ed and we therefore omit it.
Proposition 1: Under symmetric information it is optimal to give all shares
to informed investors. Formally we have ￿k = 0 for k = 0;1;2, and o⁄er prices
re￿ect the willingness to pay: po
0 = v￿2￿, po
1 = v, and po
2 = v+2￿. The expected
o⁄er price is given by
P￿ = [v + 2￿(2q ￿ 1)].
Proof. Allocating a share to the strategic trader systematically decreases the
willingness to pay of the informed investors and has no bene￿ts. Since the
12format of the mechanism imposes that all pay the same o⁄er price, there is
no possibility to increase the o⁄er price to the strategic trader￿ s valuation as
informed investors must get at least a unit to exhaust the issue.
In the particular case where z = 0, i.e. when informed investors systemati-
cally keep the share, any allocation rules lead to P￿.
We now consider asymmetric information at the IPO stage. The under-













subject to (8) and (7). Besides, to exhaust the issue we must have
8
> > > > > > <
> > > > > > :
2x2(+￿) + ￿2 = 2;
2x0(￿￿) + ￿0 = 2;
x1(+￿) + x1(￿￿) + ￿1 = 2:
(10)
Given that the strategic trader buys at most one unit we also have:
8
> > > > > > <
> > > > > > :
2x2(+￿) ￿ 1;
2x0(￿￿) ￿ 1;
x1(+￿) + x1(￿￿) ￿ 1:
(11)
13Proposition 2: The optimal solution under asymmetric information is such
that
- any investor reporting +￿ gets a share (￿2 = 0 and x1(+￿) = 1);
- the strategic trader is allocated one share in states k = 0 and k = 1
provided liquidity needs are su¢ ciently unlikely.





1 if z ￿ ^ z
0 if z > ^ z
where the value ^ z 2 [0;1] is unique and solves
"^ z
1 + 2^ z
(1 ￿ q) ￿ ￿(1 ￿ ^ z)q = 0:












The expected o⁄er price is then given by
P (￿￿;￿￿;0) = q2RI













1￿q￿ (1 ￿ z)(2 ￿ ￿￿)
i
:
5We consider q > 0.
14Proof. See Appendix.
It is straightforward to understand why ￿2 = 0 is optimal. A greater ￿2
forces po
2 down without facilitating honest interest reports. The values ￿0 and
￿1 are determined trading o⁄ lower informational rents with higher o⁄er prices.
It is important to remember that the underwriter cannot allocate a share
to the strategic trader to take advantage of his higher valuation. Instead this
investor is used strategically to lower the cost of truthful information revelation.
To satisfy (8) the underwriter can raise the bene￿t of revealing good news
(option 1) or the cost of lying (option 2). More precisely, under option 1 the
underwriter sets ￿k = 0 8k and lowers the o⁄er price in state 2. Under option
2 he serves the strategic trader in states 0 and 1. This lowers the informed
investors￿willingness to pay in those states (and thus decreases the o⁄er prices)
but allows to set a higher po
2. Which option is best depends on z.
As said earlier, serving the strategic trader in state k = 0;1 decreases the o⁄er
price in those states and the depreciation increases with z. However the o⁄er
price in state 2 (given by (12)) increases with z because a greater concern for
the aftermarket￿ s outcome makes misreporting strong interest less attractive.
Indeed, by reporting low interest the informed investor who received +￿ misleads
the dealer who sets a lower bid price. Thus as z increases option 1 becomes less
costly and dominates option 2.
Finally, let us analyze how b z varies with exogenous information parameters







15Informational rents, as shown in (12), are proportional to ￿. The greater
￿ the more po
2 must be lowered to guarantee incentive compatibility. Thus, as
￿ increases allocating a share to the strategic trader (option 2) which permits
to balance the increase in rents, is best for a wider range of values of z. The
parameter " only a⁄ects the o⁄er prices in states 0 and 1 provided ￿￿ = 1. As
" increases, the valuations of the informed investors decrease and so do po
0 and
po
1. Thus the greater " the less attractive it is to allocate a share to the strategic
trader.
4 Uniform Price Auction
There are several factors that di⁄erentiate a uniform price auction from book-
building.6 One important di⁄erence has to do with the discretion the under-
writer has in allocating and pricing the shares. Assume that the underwriter
sells the shares using a uniform price auction (which is the format used on the
website openIPO.com). Doing so he commits to sell the shares to the highest
bidders and sets the o⁄er price equal to highest losing bid. We inquire whether
the underwriter can achieve a higher revenue with such an auction. We maintain
the assumption that each investor wants at most 1 share.
Investors must bid possessing only their own information. They do not
observe any o⁄er price that would allow them to revise their valuations. Let
b(y) denote a bid from an informed investor with y 2 f+￿;￿￿g and bS denote
6For details see Jenkinson and Ljungqvist (2001).
16the strategic trader￿ s bid. We assume that bids are observable at the start of the
after-market. This means that investors have the possibility to use their bids to
signal their interest. In particular a strongly interested investor can increase the
bid price in the aftermarket if he successfully signals his valuation. We search
for a separating equilibrium where b(+￿) > b(￿￿). Besides we are interested in
a situation where the strategic trader does not pool with the informed investors,
that is bS 6= b(y) with y 2 f+￿;￿￿g.
There are 3 candidates for the type of equilibrium we are looking for:
(i) b(+￿) > b(￿￿) > bS where ￿k = 0 8k = 0;1;2;
(ii) bS > b(+￿) > b(￿￿) where ￿k = 1 8k = 0;1;2;
(iii) b(+￿) > bS > b(￿￿) where ￿2 = 0;￿1 = ￿0 = 1;
We consider that the dealer sets the share￿ s bid price according to the follow-
ing beliefs. Let ￿(b1;b2;b3) 2 R3 denote a probability vector (￿0;￿1;￿2) where
￿k is the probability that the dealer assigns to state k given that she observes








Given these equilibrium beliefs, and for any out-of-equilibrium beliefs, the
following result holds.
Lemma: There does not exist a separating equilibrium such that
b(+￿) > b(￿￿) > bS:
Proof. See Appendix.
If an informed investor is guaranteed a share whatever his interest then he
is better o⁄ bidding b(+￿). Doing so does not a⁄ect the o⁄er price but changes
the beliefs of the dealer who mistakenly eliminates state k = 0.
Equilibria (ii) and (iii) require that we de￿ne out-of-equilibrium beliefs. We
use the above lemma and consider stable out-of-equilibrium beliefs.7
Assume the strategic trader deviates and bids any b 6= bS. When the market
maker does not observe bS she knows that the strategic trader deviated from
the equilibrium path. She sets the price of a sell order considering the following
7See Cho and Kreps (1987) for a de￿nition of stability.
18beliefs:
￿(b(+￿);b(+￿);b) = (0;0;1);8b 6= b(￿￿);
￿(b(￿￿);b(￿￿);b) = (1;0;0);8b 6= b(+￿);
￿(b(+￿);b(￿￿);b) = (0;1;0);8b 6= b(+￿) and b 6= b(￿￿):
The value for ￿k is set rationally according to both the above beliefs and b.
Finally
￿(b(+￿);b(+￿);b(￿￿)) = (0;1;0) and ￿1 = 1;
￿(b(￿￿);b(￿￿);b(+￿)) = (1;0;0) and ￿0 = 1:
These beliefs are re￿ned considering that the strategic trader has no incentive
to lower his bid to b(￿￿) which in cases (ii) and (iii) is the lowest bid.
Assume now that an informed investor deviates. By observing at least one
bS the market maker knows that an informed investor deviated. We set
￿(b(+￿);bS;b) = (0;1 ￿ ￿2;￿2);
with ￿2 = 0 if b < b(+￿). Finally we have
￿(b(￿￿);bS;b) = (1 ￿ ￿1;￿1;0);
with ￿1 = 0 if b < b(+￿). These beliefs are re￿ned considering that an informed
19investor with a high valuation has no interest in lowering his bid. The value for
￿k is set consistently by comparing bS to the remaining bids.
Proposition 3 Given the beliefs de￿ned above equilibria (ii) and (iii) exist.
We have
po
k = v ￿ 2￿ ￿ ￿, for k = 0;1;
where ￿ = "z
1+2z.















[q(1 ￿ ￿2) + (1 ￿ q)(1 ￿ ￿1)];2￿
￿


















These are signaling equilibria in which all but the informed investor with
a bad signal bid aggressively. Indeed, since they do not systematically pay
their bids and because they are only concerned about expected pro￿ts (not
knowing the information possessed by other bidders) the strategic trader and
20the informed investor with strong interest bid more than their expected value
of the asset.
We ￿nally compare revenues. Keep in mind that the revenue from book-
building depends on whether z is greater or less than b z. Taking this into account
we establish the following result. Let PA and PB refer to the expected o⁄er
price from the auction and book-building respectively.
Proposition 4
Any equilibrium with bids ranked according to (iii) raises less revenue than
book-building.
Under ranking (ii) the auction equilibrium such that
b(+￿) = v ￿ ￿ + 2￿
2 ￿ q
q
can raise a higher revenue than book-building.
When q < 1
2
PA > PB , z < z0;
where z0 2 ]b z;1[ and solves
"z
1 + 2z
￿ 2￿(1 ￿ z)q = 0:
When q > 1
2
PA > PB , z < z00;




￿ ￿(1 ￿ z)(1 ￿ q) = 0:








In an auction the underwriter gets the lowest possible valuation in states
k = 0;1 where po
k = RI
0(1). The only possibility to outperform the book-
building o⁄er price occurs in state k = 2 when both informed investors are
strongly interested. This is so because investors bid more than their valuations
to signal their interest to the dealer. Interestingly the auction can perform
better only if it leads to a radically di⁄erent allocation of shares.
5 Conclusion
This paper solves for optimal IPO design in the presence of two distinct adverse
selection problems. One, as in the traditional literature, a⁄ecting the IPO stage
and the other arising in the after-market. It adds to the traditional literature
by incorporating secondary market trading and its e⁄ect on the investors￿will-
ingness to pay for the asset. We can therefore highlight the cost and bene￿ts of
having strategic traders participating in an IPO.
22Strategic traders are systematically excluded under symmetric information
because they depress the o⁄er price. Indeed, informed investors anticipate that
they will be at disadvantage in the secondary market and therefore reduce their
willingness to pay for the asset. Strategic traders are bene￿cial under asym-
metric information at the IPO stage. Indeed, provided informed investors are
su¢ ciently unlikely to face liquidity needs, allocating shares to informed traders
can increase the expected o⁄er price as it lowers the cost of inducing truthful
revelation of information.
As we consider the allocation of shares using a uniform price auction, three
features emerge. First, the auction o⁄ers the possibility for informed investors
to signal their interest to the market maker. As they do not pay their bid and
consider only expected revenue, it leads them to bid more than their expected
value of the asset. Second, the strategic trader cannot be discarded. And
third, the auction can enhance the expected o⁄er price only if it systematically
allocates a share to the strategic trader.
The paper also provides a rationale for allocating shares to the so-called
￿ ippers and more particularly to informed ￿ ippers. Within this strand, Fishe
(2002) and Fishe and Boehmer (2000) also consider this issue. However they do
not consider asymmetric information and provide a very di⁄erent rationale.
236 Appendix
Proof of proposition 2.





2 and using the full allocation of the shares as given
by (10) we can rewrite the underwriter￿ s objective as
max 2(1 ￿ q)2po
0 + 4q(1 ￿ q)RI
1(￿1) + 2q2RI
2(￿2) ￿ 2q￿(+￿;+￿) (15)













where ￿(x;y) is the expected payo⁄ to an informed investor with information x
when reporting y. Using the fact that (8) binds in equilibrium, we can further
simplify the above and get
max 2(1 ￿ q)2po
















￿4q￿ (1 ￿ z)[qx1(￿￿) + (1 ￿ q)x0(￿￿)] ￿ ￿(￿￿;￿￿):
From this expression it is obvious that ￿2 = 0 is optimal. Since (x1(￿￿)+￿1) >






= 0. Moreover to minimize ￿(￿￿;￿￿) and
set it to zero we let po
0 = RI
0(￿0). Finally, to minimize
[qx1(￿￿) + (1 ￿ q)x0(￿￿)]
24we set x1(+￿) = 1 given (11). Using these results the objective function can be
rewritten as
W (￿0;￿1;0) = 2q2RI















￿ (1 ￿ z)(2 ￿ ￿0)
￿
:
W(:) is convex in ￿0 and in ￿1. Thus we necessarily have a corner solution.
Evaluating the above expression at (0;0;0), (1;0;0), (0;1;0) and (1;1;0) leads
to the result in proposition 2.
Proof of the Lemma.
Consider a ranking of bids such that
b(+￿) > b(￿￿) > bS
and assume it forms an equilibrium where bidders get non-negative payo⁄s (or
else losing would be best). In equilibrium an informed investor with bad signal
receives an expected payo⁄ (denoted ￿￿￿(b(￿￿))) equal to:
￿￿￿(b(￿￿)) = qRI
1(0) + (1 ￿ q)RI
0(0) ￿ bS = v ￿ 2￿(1 ￿ q) ￿ bS:
If, instead of bidding b(￿￿) the informed investor with bad information deviates
to b(+￿) he lures the market maker who believes state k = 0 never occurs. His
25payo⁄ from deviation is
￿￿￿(b(+￿)) = q [v + 2￿z] + (1 ￿ q)[v ￿ 2￿(1 ￿ z)] ￿ bS
= v ￿ 2￿(1 ￿ q) ￿ bS + 2￿z > ￿￿￿(b(￿￿)):
Proof of Proposition 3.











￿ = ￿I (1) = ￿S (1):
Let ￿I(b) denote the expected pro￿t to an informed investor when bidding
b and let ￿S(b) denote the expected pro￿t to a strategic trader when bidding b.
Finally let pb(￿(:)) denote the expected bid price set by a market maker with
beliefs given by ￿(b1;b2;b3) and the corresponding rational ￿k:
pb(￿(:)) = ￿2
￿

















261- Assume there exists an equilibrium such that bS > b(+￿) > b(￿￿).
In equilibrium we must have
￿￿￿(b(￿￿)) = 0:
Indeed if b(￿￿) led to a positive expected payo⁄ then an pro￿table deviation
would be to slightly increase the bid when receiving a bad signal. This would
allow him to win with probability 1 instead of 0:5 when k = 0 and still pay the
same price. Thus, the only possibility is to have
b(￿￿) = RI
0(1) = v ￿ 2￿ ￿ ￿:























To guarantee that ￿+￿(b(+￿)) ￿ 0 we must have




27Finally, for the strategic trader we have
￿S(bS) = q2(v ￿ b(+￿)) + 2￿q(2 ￿ q) + ￿(2 ￿ q2);
under (19) ￿S(bS) > 0.
We analyze deviations considering each investor separately.
￿ Strategic trader:
Provided (19) holds, he has no interest in deviating from his bid. Indeed
doing so would potentially lower his probability to win, or else worsen the beliefs
of the market maker.
￿ Informed investor with strong interest.
Clearly he has no incentive to bid below b(+￿) as it would lower his proba-




b>b(+￿) = q [v ￿ ￿ + 2￿ (1 ￿ z(1 ￿ ￿2)) ￿ b(+￿)]






, b(+￿) ￿ v + 2￿ ￿ 2￿ ￿
4￿z
q
[q(1 ￿ ￿2) + (1 ￿ q)(1 ￿ ￿1)]: (20)
28￿ Informed investor with bad signal.
His expected pro￿t from deviating is given by the following expressions:




(v ￿ ￿ ￿ b(+￿)) + ￿z(2 ￿ q);














, b(+￿) ￿ v ￿ ￿ +
2￿z
q
[q￿2 + (1 ￿ q)￿1]
Clearly the best deviation is to set b = b(+￿). The lower bound for b(+￿)
to achieve an equilibrium depends on which prevails between (20) and (21).
Nonetheless, whichever prevails is below the upper bound given by (19).
29The following bids form an equilibrium
b(￿￿) = v ￿ 2￿ ￿ ￿;




bS = b(+￿) + ￿ with ￿ > 0:
2. Assume there exists an equilibrium such that b(+￿) > bS >
b(￿￿).
We provide a sketch of proof as it is similar to the proof above. As before




0(1) = v ￿ 2￿ ￿ ￿:
Furthermore in equilibrium the expected pro￿ts are given by
￿+￿(b(+￿)) = 2￿ ￿ qbS + qv:






￿S(bS) = 2￿(1 ￿ q2) + 4￿q(1 ￿ q) ￿ 0: (23)
Under (22) an informed investor with a good signal has no interest in de-
viating from b(+￿). Indeed doing so would potentially lower his probability to
win, or else worsen the beliefs of the market maker.
Consider an informed investor with a bad signal. In equilibrium he gets a 0
expected payo⁄. If he deviates his expected pro￿t becomes



















For any b = b(+￿)




b>b(+￿) = qv + 2￿z [￿2q + ￿1(1 ￿ q)] ￿ qbS:
Clearly the best deviation is to set b = b(+￿). To deter it we need




31Comparing the above with (22) the interval for possible bS is well de￿ned.
To complete the proof we need to guarantee that the strategic trader is not





￿S(b(+￿)) ￿ ￿S(bS) , b(+￿) ￿ v + 2￿ + ￿S(1=3);
￿S(b)
￿ ￿
b>b(+￿) ￿ ￿S(bS) , b(+￿) ￿ v + 2￿ + ￿S(1):
It is trivial to show that any bid below bS either lead to the same payo⁄ as bS
or worse if he matches b(￿￿).
The following bids form an equilibrium
b(￿￿) = v ￿ 2￿ ￿ ￿I(1)











Proof of proposition 4.
￿ Type (ii) equilibrium.
The expected o⁄er price from the auction is given by
PA = v ￿ ￿ + 2￿(2q ￿ 1):
32Consider any z < b z for which, by de￿nition:
￿(1 ￿ q) ￿ ￿(1 ￿ z)q < 0: (25)
We have PA > PB when the allocation is ￿0;1 = 1 and ￿2 = 0 if and only if
q￿ ￿ ￿(1 ￿ z)(1 ￿ q) < 0:
If q < 1=2 then the above inequality holds for all z 2 [0;b z]. If q > 1=2 then
there exists a unique z00 such that the above inequality holds for z 2 [0;z00].
Consider any z > b z for which, by de￿nition:
￿(1 ￿ q) ￿ ￿(1 ￿ z)q > 0: (26)
We have PA > PB when ￿k = 0 8k, if and only if
￿ ￿ 2￿(1 ￿ z)q < 0:
If q > 1=2 then the above inequality never holds. If q < 1=2 then there exists a
unique z0 such that the above inequality holds for z 2 [b z;z0]. The case q = 1=2
is straightforward.
33￿ Type (iii) equilibrium.
The highest expected o⁄er price from the auction is given by
PA = v + 2￿ (q(1 + q) ￿ 1) ￿ ￿(1 ￿ q2):
It is straightforward to show that when (25) holds so that ￿0;1 = 1 and ￿2 = 0,
then we have PA < PB. Similarly when (26) holds so that ￿k = 0 8k then we
have PA < PB.
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